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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”)1 aims at the conservation of the variability of 
living organisms2 and their interactions, and the sustainable use of living natural resources, 
encompassing genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. It also concerns the use of non-
living natural resources that may affect biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, including climate 
change mitigation and adaptation measures.3 In 2014, I argued that against all odds the CBD made 
significant conceptual and normative contributions to the relationship between human rights and the 
environment, specifically with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources.4  These 
contributions also clarified the normative content of due diligence in the context of the business 
responsibility to respect human rights.5 These contributions resulted from the procedural openness to 
inputs from indigenous peoples in negotiations under the CBD6 as well as the commitment of CBD 
 
 1. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
 2. This article will use the definition of biodiversity as defined in CBD Article 2 as “the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.” 
 3. Elisa Morgera, Against All Odds: The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity to International 
Human Rights Law, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PIERRE-MARIE 
DUPUY 983 (Denis Alland et al. eds., 2014), at 983–95. 
 4. See generallyMorgera, supra note 3. 
 5. This was also expanded upon in Elisa Morgera, Benefit-Sharing as a Bridge between Human Rights and the 
Environment and Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Corporations, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DIMENSIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 37–68 (Ben Boer ed., 2015). 
 6. Under the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j) (traditional knowledge), the fullest possible participation of 
indigenous and local communities is ensured in all Working Group meetings, including in contact groups, by welcoming 
community representatives as Friends of the Co-Chairs, Friends of the Bureau and Co-Chairs of contact groups; without 
prejudice to the applicable rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties establishing that representatives duly 
nominated by parties are to conduct the business of CBD meetings so that any text proposal by indigenous and local 
communities’ representatives must be supported by at least one party.  Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biodiversity, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related 
Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/11/7 (Nov. 24, 2011), 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-11/official/cop-11-07-en.pdf. 
 parties to adopt consensus decisions.  Such consensus, however, came at the cost of qualified language7 
with a view to maintaining a very wide margin of discretion in interpretation and implementation.  
Today, these developments remain to be studied in more depth from a human rights perspective, as the 
prevailing view remains that the CBD and its instruments do not engage explicitly with human rights 
language and concepts.8  On the contrary, the reticence of CBD parties to embrace human rights should 
be seen, in and of itself, as an object of study that can help better understand individual countries’ 
interpretations of international human rights law.  Negotiations under the CBD, for instance, highlight 
continued opposition to “free, prior informed consent” of indigenous peoples9 and the broader 
relevance10 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,11 notwithstanding its 
intervening universal endorsement.12  
However, over the past five years, the relationship between the CBD and international human 
rights law has been brought to a whole new level.  The increasing reliance on the CBD and its 
instruments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well as the work of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, have shed new light on the role of the CBD in 
ensuring the protection, respect, and realization of human rights.  This Article will assess the degree to 
which the relationship between the CBD and international human rights law has been clarified and why 
this relationship matters.  It will also analyze the legal arguments advanced by those CBD parties that 
wish to keep some distance between these two bodies of international law and identify the opportunities 
that can be missed in ongoing work under the CBD. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DEVELOPMENTS RELYING ON THE CBD 
The 2017 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment13 focusing 
on biodiversity and ecosystem services14 can certainly be considered a landmark for the CBD.  For the 
 
 7. See Elisa Morgera & Elsa Tsioumani, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 21 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 3 (2011). 
 8. E.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 617, 627 (3d ed. 2009); see, e.g., U.N. 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Rep. of the Tenth Session of the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ¶¶ 
26–27, U.N. Doc. E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/14 (May 16–27, 2011); see also James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/67/301 
(Aug. 13, 2012). 
 9. See Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 7, Oct. 29, 2010, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 
(entered into force Oct. 12, 2014) (resulting in the adoption of the ambiguous expression “prior informed consent or 
approval and involvement”).  Note that the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues stated that the term “consultation” 
cannot replace or undermine the right of indigenous peoples to prior informed consent.  See Rep. on the Tenth Session of 
the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, supra note 8, ¶ 36.  
 10. E.g., Nagoya Protocol, supra note 9, at preambular recital para. 26; Morgera & Tsioumani, supra note 7, at 15–16, 
18–23. 
 11. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 12. The adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly was initially opposed by Australia, Canada, the US, and 
New Zealand.  All these countries reversed their position by 2010.  See Press Release, U.N. Human Rights Office of the 
High Comm’r, Indigenous Rights Declaration Endorsed by States (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Indigenousrightsdeclarationendorsed.aspx. 
 13. John H. Knox (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment), Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/49 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
 14. Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, such as: food, water, timber, and fiber; 
regulating services that affect climate, floods, diseases, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, 
aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling.  See 
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,  LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 
 first time, CBD obligations have been authoritatively assessed as a matter of international human rights 
law, based on the unequivocal understanding that the full enjoyment of everyone’s human rights to 
life, health, food, and water depend on healthy ecosystems and their benefits to people.15  In other 
words, the protection and realization of basic human rights depend on successful efforts to prevent 
biodiversity loss.16 Not only did Special Rapporteur Knox make references to the well-understood role 
of biodiversity as a reservoir of infinite potential for the development of new medicinal and food 
products, but he also discussed the often-undervalued importance of biodiversity for mental health.17  
He further underscored more subtle relationships between human well-being and biodiversity, such as 
the relationship between healthy pollinators and global food security.18  This multi-faceted recognition 
of the implications of biodiversity underpins the role of civil and political rights in the context of 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. Special Rapporteur Knox highlighted that States’ efforts 
to increase and make available information on biodiversity, as well as to ensure public participation in 
relevant decision-making processes and access to justice in biodiversity-related matters, should be seen 
as international human rights obligations.19  In particular, States need to make more of an effort to 
protect biodiversity defenders because those protecting endangered species, as exemplified by Special 
Rapporteur Knox, are doing so to the benefit of human rights.20  These clarifications are particularly 
significant to move away from an understanding of the procedural dimensions of biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use21 as mere good governance.22  These clarifications further assist in 
understanding international human rights law obligations as limitations to the discretion of CBD parties 
in their interpretation and implementation of otherwise open-ended treaty language. These 
clarifications are also noteworthy because of limited research on general, procedural human rights in 
the context of the CBD.23 
In addition, Special Rapporteur Knox clarified that there are substantive human rights law 
obligations that serve to clarify the limits of State discretion in pursuing the CBD objectives relating 
to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.24  This acknowledgment has two implications.  At the 
domestic level, in authorizing any activity, either conservation or use, CBD parties are to ensure that 
no unjustified, foreseeable infringements of human rights may arise from the decision.25  This is both 
based on potential public interventions that may infringe biodiversity-dependent human rights and on 
 
(2005), https://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/BoardStatement.html.  Note that in 2017, the Intergovernmental 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) is now referring to the term “nature’s contributions to people” 
to refer to “all the positive contributions or benefits, and occasionally negative contributions, losses or detriments, that 
people obtain from nature’ and ‘explicitly embracing concepts associated with other worldviews on human-nature relations 
and knowledge systems.”  IPBES, Implementation of the First Work Programme of the Platform art. III, ¶¶ 8–9, IPBES-
5/1 (2017); Unai Pascual et al., Valuing Nature’s Contributions to People: The IPBES Approach, 26–27 CURRENT OPINION 
IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 7, 15, 8–9 (2017). 
 15. Knox, supra note 13, ¶ 5. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. ¶ 12. 
 18. Id. ¶¶ 11–20. 
 19. Id. ¶¶ 27–32. 
 20. Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 68. 
 21. Id. ¶ 67. 
 22. Edith Brown Weiss & Ahila Sornarajah, Good Governance, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). 
 23. Lalanath de Silva, Public Participation in Biodiversity Conservation, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BIODIVERSITY AND NATURE PROTECTION LAW 468, 471–74 (Elisa Morgera & Jona Razzaque eds., 
2017). 
 24. Knox, supra note 13, ¶ 34. 
 25. Id. 
 States’ obligation to prevent business entities from violating these rights.26  In other words, 
implementing the CBD obligations in a mutually supportive way with international human rights law 
clarifies that States must develop laws and institutions that effectively “regulate harm to biodiversity 
from private actors as well as government entities” in a way that is “non-retrogressive and non-
discriminatory.”27  These are crucial indications about the minimum content of the international 
obligations contained in the CBD, which tend to be agnostic about specific means of implementation. 
At the multilateral level, Special Rapporteur Knox has indicated that inter-State cooperation on 
biodiversity also has human rights implications.28  This implies both that donor States’ duties to support 
biodiversity efforts in developing countries are relevant to realize human rights dependent on 
biodiversity and that such support should not be carried out in a way that may lead to violations of 
other human rights.29  While the latter issue has already been addressed to some extent by CBD parties, 
with an explicit reference to the relevant international human rights instruments,30 the former issue 
remains a matter for further study.31  In his Framework Principles on Human Rights and the 
Environment, Special Rapporteur Knox further clarified that the human rights implications of the 
international duty to cooperate also entail deeper forms of engagement under multilateral 
environmental agreements, as well as consideration of the linkages between international 
environmental law, including international biodiversity law and human rights in the context of 
international trade and investment agreements.32  While trade and investment an area that has already 
attracted research,33 there is still little reflection on the duty to cooperate under multilateral 
environmental agreements.34  One angle that can serve to further clarify the relationship between CBD 
obligations on financing, technology transfer, capacity building, information-sharing and scientific 
cooperation, and human rights, for instance, is provided by the ongoing efforts to clarify the normative 
content of the human right to science.35 
A.  Indigenous Peoples’ Rights  
The work of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment focused on those 
most vulnerable to biodiversity loss, notably indigenous peoples36 that are uniquely dependent on 
 
 26. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
 27. Id. ¶ 69. 
 28. Id. ¶ 36–48. 
 29. Id. ¶ 70. 
 30. Conference of the Parties to CBD Dec. XII/3, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/3, annex 3, ¶ 3(b)–(c) (Oct. 
6–17, 2014) [hereinafter COP CBD Dec. XII/3]; see Claudia Ituarte-Lima et al., Safeguards in Scaling-up Biodiversity 
Financing and Possible Guiding Principles, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/11/INF/7 (Oct. 7, 2012); CLAUDIA ITUARTE-LIMA 
ET AL., BIODIVERSITY FINANCING AND SAFEGUARDS (2014), http://swed.bio/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ituarte-Lima-
Schultzetal2014cop-12-inf-27-en.pdf. 
 31. COP CBD Dec. XII/3, supra note 30, ¶ 1. 
 32. Knox, supra note 13, ¶¶ 36–39.  
 33. E.g., Elisa Morgera, The Promotion of Environmental Rights through the Bilateral Agreements of the European 
Union: Mapping the Field, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR COMMON GOODS 421–41 (Lenzerini & Vrdoljak eds., 2014). 
 34. COP CBD Dec. XII/3, supra note 30, ¶ 1. 
 35. Elisa Morgera, Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing at the Crossroads of the Human Right to Science and 
International Biodiversity Law, 4 LAWS 803–31 (2015). 
 36. Note that the UN Special Rapporteur also raised the issue of other communities than indigenous ones that are 
entitled to similar protection under international law.  See Elisa Morgera, A Reflection on Benefit-sharing as a Framework 
Principle on Human Rights and the Environment Proposed by UN Special Rapporteur John Knox (Part II: Right-holders 
and Duty-bearers), BENELEX BLOG (Apr. 8, 2018), https://benelexblog.wordpress.com/2018/04/08/a-reflection-on-benefit-
sharing-as-a-framework-principle-on-human-rights-and-the-environment-proposed-by-un-special-rapporteur-john-knox-
part-ii-right-holders-and-duty-bearers/. 
 biological resources for their material and cultural needs.37  As a result, one of the most original 
elements in the Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment is Framework Principle 
15, which is also the Principle that draws the most from the CBD.38  
Framework Principle 15 concerns the use of lands, territories, and resources that are traditionally 
owned, occupied, or used by indigenous peoples, including those to which they have had access for 
their subsistence and traditional activities, even when they not have formal recognition of property 
rights or delimitation and demarcation of boundaries.39  These resources are linked to indigenous 
peoples’ traditional knowledge and genetic resources.40  Framework Principle 15 entails a series of 
interconnected obligations to ensure indigenous peoples’ full and effective participation in decision-
making on the entire spectrum of matters that affect their lives, including legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect them directly, programs for the exploration, exploitation or conservation of 
resources pertaining to their lands or territories, and proposals to alienate lands or territories or 
otherwise transfer their rights.41  These obligations entails consulting with indigenous peoples to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent (“FPIC”) before taking or approving any measures that may 
affect their lands, territories, or resources, on the basis of access to all relevant information in 
understandable and accessible forms42 and prior assessments of the environmental and social impacts 
of proposed measures.43  These assessments “should be in accord with the guidelines adopted by the 
Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,” notably the Akwé: Kon Voluntary 
Guidelines on environmental and socio-cultural assessments.44  Furthermore, Framework Principle 15 
refers to States’ obligations to ensure that indigenous peoples and members of traditional communities 
“fairly and equitably share the benefits from activities relating to their lands, territories or resources.”45  
This obligation is, in turn, connected with the need to respect and protect indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge and practices in relation to the conservation and sustainable use of their lands, 
territories, resources,46 and the environment, including through States’ assistance to indigenous 
peoples’ efforts to preserve the productive capacity of their lands, territories, and resources.47 
The inclusion of benefit-sharing is particularly significant. International human rights law 
processes have referred to it through inconsistent terminology, while under international biodiversity 
law the term has been used consistently but is not defined.  In both areas, however, it can be argued 
that “sharing” benefits underscores the agency of beneficiaries and the need to build a genuine 
partnership among actors whose relationship is characterized by power asymmetries.48  In addition, 
 
 37. Knox, supra note 13, ¶¶ 22–25, 49–64. 
 38. The following discussion is based on Elisa Morgera, A Reflection on Benefit-sharing as a Framework Principle on 
Human Rights and the Environment proposed by UN Special Rapporteur John Knox (Part I), BENELEX BLOG (Apr. 8, 
2018), https://benelexblog.wordpress.com/2018/04/08/a-reflection-on-benefit-sharing-as-a-framework-principle-on-
human-rights-and-the-environment-proposed-by-un-special-rapporteur-john-knox-part-i/. 
 39. Knox, supra note 13, ¶¶ 53, 48. 
 40. Id. ¶ 53. 
 41. Id. ¶ 50. 
 42. Which is linked to Knox’s Framework Principles 7 and 8.  Id. at Framework Principle 7, 8. 
 43. Id. ¶ 20. 
 44. Conference of the Parties to CBD Dec. VII/16, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/16, annex, § F (Apr. 13, 
2014) [hereinafter Akwé: Kon Guidelines]; Knox, supra note 13, ¶ 43. 
 45. Knox, supra note 13, at Framework Principle 15(d). 
 46. Id. ¶ 52. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Elisa Morgera, Under the Radar: Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing and the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and Local Communities Related to Natural Resources at 8 (BENELEX, Working Paper No. 10 rev, 2018) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2887803.  Benefit-sharing under international biodiversity and human rights law can be thus 
defined as concerted and dialogic partnership-building in identifying and allocating economic, socio-cultural, and 
 Framework Principle 15 provides the most comprehensive list of benefit-sharing triggers in 
international human rights law.49  Special Rapporteur Knox further clarifies that benefit-sharing must 
be consistent with indigenous peoples’ and traditional communities’ own priorities.50  He implicitly 
links it to the need for recognition of rights to the lands, territories, and resources that they have 
traditionally owned, occupied, or used as well as due respect for the customs, traditions, and land tenure 
systems of the peoples or communities concerned, and effective remedies for violations of rights.51  
Special Rapporteur Knox substantiated benefit-sharing on the basis of the particular vulnerability of 
indigenous peoples to environmental harm “because of their close relationship with the natural 
ecosystems on their ancestral territories.”52 
Overall, Principle 15 reflects the cross-fertilization between international human rights law and 
international biodiversity law fostered by the work of former UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, James Anaya53 and the seminal case law of the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights.54  Both have relied on decisions adopted under the CBD.55  The Inter-American Court initially 
made a reference to the CBD Akwe: Kon Guidelines as the “relevant international standards and best 
practice” in a footnote56 in determining that extractive activities on indigenous peoples’ lands can only 
proceed after an environmental and socio-cultural impact assessment, FPIC, and benefit-sharing.57  In 
the 2015 Kaliña & Lokono58 decision, the court was much more explicit about the need for, and merits 
of, mutual supportiveness with consensus guidance adopted under the CBD.59  It underscored States’ 
obligations to protect, in a manner compatible with their international environmental obligations, 
indigenous peoples’ rights to a dignified life and to cultural identity connected with natural resources 
in their traditional territories.60  In support of this interpretation, it cited the expert opinion of then UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, as follows:  
International environmental law and international human rights law should not be considered 
separate, but rather interrelated and complementary, bodies of law.  Indeed, the States Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have incorporated respect for the related 
 
environmental benefits among State and non-State actors, with an emphasis on the vulnerable.  See Elisa Morgera, The 
Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing 27 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 383 (2016) 
[hereinafter Morgera, The Need] 
 49. Morgera, The Need, supra note 48, at 372–78. 
 50. Knox, supra note 13, ¶ 53. 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 47–49, 53. Framework Principle 10 makes clear what “effective remedies” entail. Id. at Framework Principle 
10. 
 52. Id. ¶ 47. 
 53. Elisa Morgera, The Legacy of UN Special Rapporteur Anaya on Indigenous Peoples and Benefit-sharing, BENELEX 
BLOG (May 29, 2014), https://benelexblog.wordpress.com/2014/05/29/the-legacy-of-un-special-rapporteur-anaya-on-
indigenous-peoples-and-benefit-sharing/. 
 54. See, e.g., Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, ¶ 41 (Aug. 12, 2008). 
 55. See id.; James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Measures Needed to Secure 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Land and Related Rights in Suriname, ¶¶ 8–12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.7 (Aug. 18, 
2011). 
 56. Case of the Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, supra note 54, ¶ 41. 
 57. Id. 
58 Case of the Kaliña & Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 309, ¶ 172 (Nov. 25, 2015). 
 59. Id. at ¶¶ 173–74, 177–78, 181, 214 n.247 (referencing Conference of the Parties to CBD Dec. VII/12, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/12, annex II (Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter COP CBD Dec. VII/12], and Conference of the Parties 
to CBD Dec. VII/28, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/28, annex (Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter COP CBD Dec. 
VII/28]); Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 1, arts. 8(j), 10, 14. 
 60. Case of the Kaliña & Lokono Peoples, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, supra note 58, ¶¶ 181, 193. 
 international rights and obligations into their decision on protected areas in relation to 
indigenous peoples. . . . The CBD, and its authorized interpretation by the Conference of the 
Parties, defends fully the rights of the indigenous peoples in relation to the protected areas 
and requires that these are established and managed in full compliance with the State’s 
international obligations.  This permits the application of the whole range of the State’s human 
rights obligations as defined by the American Convention on Human Rights and established 
in the UN Declaration.  It is also the consensus reflected in the main international policy norms 
and best practice. . . . The [UN] Rapporteur has adhered to these same basic principles 
affirmed by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination.61 
The Inter-American Court, therefore, appears to consider the consensus decisions adopted by CBD 
parties as interpretative tools not only for the purposes of the CBD itself but also for a mutually 
supportive interpretation of relevant international human rights law.  Accordingly, it relied on CBD 
Articles 8(j) and 10(c) addressing indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge and their customary 
sustainable use of biological resources, as well as the CBD program of work on protected areas,62 to 
identify safeguards for establishing conservation measures on traditional lands. These safeguards 
comprise effective participation, access and use of their traditional territories, and benefit-sharing, 
provided that they are compatible with protection and sustainable use.63  Furthermore, the court found 
that the absence of explicit mechanisms that guarantee benefit-sharing from conservation measures is 
a violation of political rights, relying on the CBD obligation on environmental impact assessments.64  
This confirms that CBD decisions, even if they do not employ human rights terminology, provide 
helpful guidance for the interpretation and implementation of international human rights standards 
concerning indigenous and tribal peoples.  It equally shows that while State discretion is quite wide in 
implementing the CBD, applicable international human rights law restricts such discretion and 
provides for minimum guarantees whenever indigenous peoples are concerned.  The reflection of this 
case law into the UN Framework Principles corroborates the view expressed by the Inter-American 
Court that benefit-sharing obligations are also implicit in global human rights instruments,65 and this 
interpretation is therefore relevant for other regions.66 
III.  CBD DEVELOPMENTS OF RELEVANCE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Despite the doubts that may arise from the open-ended language and lack of explicit references to 
human rights in the CBD and the guidelines adopted under it , the discussion above indicates that CBD 
instruments nevertheless provide useful guidance on implementation that cannot be found in the 
relevant international human rights law sources.  This Part will explore this point further through two 
examples that serve to illustrate the significant level of operational detail that CBD instruments can 
offer to rather abstract international human rights obligations by placing them in the specific context 
of natural resource management and planning.  The two examples are the above-cited Akwé: Kon 
 
 61. Id. ¶ 174 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. ¶¶ 178, 214 n.247; COP CBD Dec. VII/28, supra note 59. 
 63. Case of Kaliña & Lokono Peoples, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, supra note 58, ¶ 181. 
 64. Id. ¶ 197 (relying on Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 1, art. 14). 
 65. Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 95 (Nov. 28, 2007) (referencing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), arts. 1 and 27, Dec. 26, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3). 
 66. Morgera, supra note 38. 
 Guidelines on environmental and socio-cultural assessments and the more recent Mo’otz Kuxtal 
Voluntary Guidelines on consent and benefit-sharing from the use of traditional knowledge.67  
A. Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
The Akwé: Kon Guidelines have been relied upon in the international human rights context 
because they provide concrete and systematic indications on how impact assessments should be 
conducted.  They clarify that processes should be established for recording indigenous communities’ 
views, including when they are unable to attend public meetings because of remoteness or poor health, 
as well as the usage of non-written forms.68  In addition, governments should provide sufficient human, 
financial, technical, and legal resources to support indigenous expertise proportionally to the scale of 
the proposed development, and indigenous communities should be involved in the financial auditing 
processes of the development so that the resources invested are used effectively.69 
Besides step-by-step guidance to implementation, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines further provide 
hooks for more transformative changes in impact assessment practices.  The integration of benefit-
sharing as part of the assessment,70 for instance, arguably helps move away from an exclusive focus 
on “damage control”71 that tends to characterize these exercises.  Consideration of benefits rather calls 
for a systematic consideration of positive implications, not only negative impacts (such as potential 
damage to ways of life, livelihoods, well-being, and traditional knowledge), of proposed 
developments.72  Thus, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines focus on elements that can support considering 
benefits from indigenous peoples’ perspective, such as food, health, environmental sustainability, and 
community well-being, vitality and viability (employment levels and opportunities, welfare, education, 
and availability and standards of housing, infrastructure, services).73  With that, the Guidelines may 
“open up” the assessment to different worldviews in order to take into account, in an integrated manner, 
indigenous peoples’ rights over lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by them and associated 
biodiversity.74 The Guidelines do so by calling for the assessment of the following cultural aspects: 
beliefs systems, languages and customs, traditional systems of natural resource use, maintenance of 
genetic diversity through indigenous customary management, exercise of customary laws regarding 
land tenure, and distribution of resources and benefits of transgenerational aspects, including 
opportunities for elders to pass on their knowledge to youths.75 
It should also be noted that the Akwé: Kon Guidelines have influenced the practice of international 
corporate accountability mechanisms.  For instance, the UK National Contact Point used the Akwé: 
 
 67. The Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines for the development of mechanisms, legislation or other appropriate 
initiatives to ensure the “prior and informed consent,” “free, prior and informed consent,” or “approval and involvement,” 
depending on national circumstances, of indigenous peoples and local communities for accessing their knowledge, 
innovations and practices, for fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of their knowledge, innovations 
and practices relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and for reporting and preventing 
unlawful appropriation of traditional knowledge.  Conference of the Parties to CBD Dec. XIII/18, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/18, Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines (Dec. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Mo’otz Kuxtal 
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 Kon Guidelines to interpret the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)  
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises76 to determine that a mining company did not employ 
culturally adequate means of communication to consult with indigenous communities with a very high 
rate of illiteracy.77  The Akwé: Kon Guidelines were equally relied upon by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights78 in interpreting the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights.79  
Along similar lines, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples stressed the link 
between FPIC, benefit-sharing, and mitigation measures in the context of large-scale natural resource 
extraction on indigenous peoples’ territories on the basis of the CBD work program on protected areas 
and the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.80  More recently, Special Rapporteur Knox has recommended that 
private companies involved in conservation also respect the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.81 
B. Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines 
A more recent  contribution from the CBD to international human rights law can be found in the 
2016 Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines on consent and benefit-sharing from the use of traditional knowledge 
of indigenous peoples.  A remarkably collaborative and frank exchange of ideas between parties and 
non-State actors characterized the negotiations on these guidelines,82 with a great number of 
suggestions made by indigenous peoples’ representatives incorporated into this instrument.83  
Nonetheless, unequivocal reliance on international human rights language (notably from the UN 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights) remained very controversial, as demonstrated by 
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 protracted contention over whether to use the expression “free prior informed consent.”84  Due to the 
inability of national delegations to find consensus on this point, the Guidelines eventually make 
reference to “the “prior and informed consent,” “free, prior and informed consent” or “approval and 
involvement,” depending on national circumstances.”85  One explanation for the awkward wording can 
be found in the Guidelines themselves, which note that it would be “not practical to propose a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach” since the document is intended to be used “taking into account national and 
local circumstances of the indigenous peoples and local communities concerned.”86  However, another 
explanation can be found in the statements made by some governments to the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples87 and their desire to protect room for maneuvering at the national level 
in regulating their relationships with indigenous peoples. 
While the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines fall short of aligning with common terminology in other 
international processes, they nevertheless contain several elements that serve to explain what “free” 
prior informed consent means, which remains a controversial matter in international human rights 
law.88  The Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines explain that this concept has a number of connotations that go 
beyond the mere absence of coercion.  First, FPIC conveys that indigenous peoples should not be 
“pressured, intimidated, manipulated or unduly influenced.”89  Second, the understanding of “prior” 
underscores the need to take into account the time requirements of indigenous peoples’ own decision-
making procedures.90  Third, the understanding of “consent or approval” includes the right not to grant 
consent and only allow the temporary use of traditional knowledge for the purpose for which it was 
granted unless it was otherwise mutually agreed.91  Fourth, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines provide step-
by-step guidance to implement FPIC: the provision of adequate and balanced information from a 
variety of sources that is made available in indigenous or local languages, to ensure that all parties have 
the same understanding of the information and terms provided; the submission of a written application 
in a manner and language comprehensible to the traditional knowledge holder; and a legitimate and 
culturally appropriate form of decision-making process, including consideration of possible social, 
cultural and economic impacts.92  More fundamentally, the Guidelines emphasize that FPIC is a 
“continual process of building mutually beneficial, ongoing arrangements between users and holders 
of traditional knowledge, in order to build trust, good relations, mutual understanding, intercultural 
spaces, knowledge exchanges, and to create new knowledge and reconciliation.”93  This is a key 
clarification that consent or approval is an iterative process, not a one-time exercise, which “should 
underpin and be an integral part of developing a relationship between users and providers of traditional 
knowledge.”94 
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 All these indications appear helpful in clarifying the international community’s expectations about 
the quality and aims of any interactions among governments, non-State actors, and indigenous peoples.  
To a significant extent, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines support the proposition made by indigenous 
peoples’ representatives engaging in their negotiations that “free” serves to imply a process that is 
“self-directed by the community” from whom consent is sought, with a view to emphasizing the need 
for communities to control the context of decision-making.95  
In line with this understanding of consent, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines emphasize that benefit-
sharing is also about iterative partnership building, rather than a top-down, one-time or unilateral flow 
of benefits where indigenous peoples are passive beneficiaries.96  These guidelines make reference to 
partnership and cooperation as principles guiding the process for establishing mutually agreed terms 
to ensure fair and equitable benefit-sharing with and among traditional knowledge holders.97  In 
addition, they indicate that “benefits should, as far as possible, be shared in understandable and 
culturally appropriate formats, with a view to building enduring relationships, promoting intercultural 
exchanges, knowledge and technology transfer, synergies, complementarity and respect.”98  In other 
words, they hint that FPIC and benefit-sharing are intertwined and geared towards the same aim.  
Furthermore, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines draw attention to the role of benefit-sharing in supporting 
cultural reproduction, by stating that “benefit-sharing could include a way of recognizing and 
strengthening the contribution of indigenous peoples and local communities to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, including by supporting the intergenerational transmission of 
traditional knowledge.”99 
Similarly to guidance emerging in international human rights law, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines 
underscore that benefit-sharing “may vary depending upon the type of benefits, the specific conditions 
and national legislation in the country where the traditional knowledge was originally accessed, the 
content of the mutually agreed terms and the stakeholders involved,” and benefit-sharing mechanisms 
“should be flexible” and determined on a case-by-case basis.100  In addition, the Mo’otz Kuxtal 
Guidelines do nevertheless call attention to the needs for information, as part of prior “informed” 
consent, to be provided on benefit-sharing arrangements and grievance mechanisms. 
Concerns about potential inequities at the level of intra-community benefit-sharing that have 
already been encapsulated in other international guidelines, notably, the Committee on Food Security’s 
Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Investment,101 are also addressed.  The Mo’otz Kuxtal 
Guidelines note that “benefit-sharing should be fair and equitable within and among relevant groups, 
taking into account relevant community level procedures, and as appropriate gender and 
age/intergenerational considerations.”102  
In addition to these conceptual clarifications, these Guidelines also provide operative details to 
address the crucial question of legal pluralism by devoting significant attention to “community 
protocols” as tools that: 
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 cover a broad array of expressions, articulations, rules and practices generated by communities 
to set out how they expect other stakeholders to engage with them.  They may reference 
customary as well as national or international laws to affirm their rights to be approached 
according to a certain set of standards.103 
These protocols: 
provide communities an opportunity to focus on their development aspirations vis-a-vis their 
rights and to articulate for themselves and for users their understanding of their bio-cultural 
heritage and therefore on what basis they will engage with a variety of stakeholders.  By 
considering the interconnections of their land rights, current socio-economic situation, 
environmental concerns, customary laws and traditional knowledge, communities are better 
placed to determine for themselves how to negotiate with a variety of actors.104 
At the initiative of indigenous peoples’ representatives, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines provide an 
overview of the possible content of community protocols, such as “information about community 
identity, community history, and community territoriality”; “social organization and decision-making 
processes (which are often collective decision-making procedures at the community level)”; concerns 
about the implementation of environmental laws according to customary laws; and concerns about 
sustainable development on community lands.105 
Community protocols have been brought to the CBD agenda as a result of the work of the non-
governmental organizations both in local communities and around the international negotiating table106 
and remain to be studied from an international human rights law perspective.  Community protocols 
may, for instance, create a risk that governments would apply pressure from above to force 
communities to codify their understandings of benefit-sharing in community protocols and adapt local 
benefit-sharing norms to international standards that may be exogenously interpreted by governments 
or outsiders.107  Interestingly, during the negotiations of the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines, delegates 
eventually agreed to eliminate proposed text stating that indigenous peoples may wish to include 
special measures in their community protocols for encouraging non-commercial research, participatory 
research, and joint research for conservation and sustainable use,108 as this was seen as an example of 
potential pressure from the outside.  Overall, more research remains to be undertaken on the potential 
of community protocols to inject the CBD and other international fora with local voices to “expand 
understandings of benefit-sharing beyond the monetary definitions linked to capitalist and colonial 
logics sometimes assumed to be the benefits of highest interest to local groups” and to “challenge 
power relations both within and outside communities in order to create spaces for dialogues between 
discourses.”109 
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 IV.  DIVERGENT VIEWS ON LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
While it is in qualified and often convoluted language,110 a body of intergovernmental guidance 
for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples has emerged from the CBD and is supported by 
the consensus of 196 Parties.111  Consensus may have a “powerful law-making effect” by way of 
“securing widespread support for a text that legitimizes and promotes consistent State practice . . . .”112  
Even if CBD parties have been very careful in labeling relevant decisions as “voluntary” guidelines, 
this has not prevented the Inter-American Court, for instance, from considering such guidance as an 
authoritative interpretation of international obligations both under the CBD and relevant international 
human rights treaties. 
This evolutive and mutually supportive interpretation should be contrasted with more recent 
practice under the CBD where the voluntary nature of the guidelines tends to be further qualified.  For 
instance, in taking a decision on adopting the terminology “indigenous peoples and local communities” 
(rather than “indigenous and local communities,” which is used in the CBD text itself), CBD parties 
went to great lengths to indicate that the decision had no implication from the perspective of treaty 
interpretation (either as subsequent agreement or subsequent practice).113  These qualifications have 
successively been cited in the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines,114 to pre-empt limitations to States’ discretion 
in developing national legislation.  In addition, the Mo’otz Kuxtal Guidelines indicate that they “do 
not apply” to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources under the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing115 but “may be used as an input, where appropriate, 
for the development of specific instruments under the Protocol.”116  This seems to indicate that the 
Guidelines cannot be seen as an interpretative material for the Nagoya Protocol as a matter of 
international law, but only as a loose source of inspiration as a matter of domestic implementation.  In 
other words, some CBD parties have sought to limit the international law-making implications of these 
instruments.  Consensus has been reached on the understanding that the Guidelines represent best 
practice, not authoritative agreement on treaty interpretation. 
These developments can be usefully related to the considerations made by Special Rapporteur 
Knox with regard to the status of progressive development of international law underpinning the UN 
Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.  As Special Rapporteur Knox indicated, 
the Framework Principles can be seen as “best practices” that serve to “facilitate the implementation” 
of existing international obligations and that reflect growing “coherence in the interpretation by binding 
human rights tribunals and authoritative human rights bodies.”117  Further, the Framework Principles 
provide “strong evidence of the converging trends towards greater uniformity and certainty in … 
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 understanding.”118  Special Rapporteur Knox, therefore, considered that this interpretation “should be 
accepted as a reflection of actual or emerging international human rights law.”119  On the other hand, 
he cautioned that “not all States have formally accepted” the international norms upon which these 
coherent interpretations are based, which is particularly significant in the case of emerging, rather than 
actual, international law.120  The qualifications in the CBD guidance can thus be interpreted as an 
expression of disagreement among CBD parties as to whether certain interpretations reflect existing or 
emerging international law, based also on the fact that each individual party to the CBD may not have 
formally accepted the same underlying international human rights norms.  Nevertheless, Special 
Rapporteur Knox has indicated that the best practice should be “adopt[ed] as expeditiously as 
possible.”121  In other words, it becomes increasingly difficult for a State to defend an approach that 
goes against an internationally recognized best practice, particularly when it has agreed upon it after 
intensely participating in intergovernmental negotiations .  
V.  OUTLOOK 
Over the past five years, the once taboo relationship between international human rights law and 
biodiversity has received increasing attention and has benefitted from a remarkable degree of 
clarification.  Nevertheless, there remain CBD parties that appear worried about the limitations to their 
exercise of discretion that may arise from a mutually supportive interpretation of the relevant 
international human rights law. These parties, however, risk missing the synergetic opportunities 
arising from a more explicit linkage between international biodiversity and human rights law in terms 
of heightened sense of urgency, enhanced policy coherence, and more widely-shared legitimacy122 of 
international and domestic efforts to implement the Convention. 
Times are particularly ripe for such a reflection.  CBD parties and stakeholders are developing a 
new global biodiversity strategy that is expected to guide international cooperation and country- and 
local-level implementation.123  The relevance of biodiversity for the protection and realization of basic 
human rights could be a key, and certainly, a new element of reflection, especially in light of growing 
scientific evidence on124 and an international policy commitment125 to the multiple linkages between 
biodiversity and human health.  In addition, CBD parties are developing a long-term, strategic approach 
to mainstreaming biodiversity into various production sectors, from agriculture, fisheries and forestry, 
to infrastructure, energy, mining and health, to feed into the realization of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (“SDGs”).126  They have already adopted consensus guidance on mainstreaming that is 
noteworthy from a human rights perspective.  This guidance makes reference to the promotion of an 
“equitable and participatory approach to the management and restoration of critical ecosystems” and 
the recognition of traditional knowledge, including a reference to “cosmo-visions” in the context of 
mainstreaming biodiversity in the agricultural sector.  This guidance also points to the development of 
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 legal frameworks or administrative measures for land use to enhance the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity, while recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to lands and resources.127  As is 
true for other CBD instruments, the agreed text shies away from human rights language.  Nonetheless, 
it presents elements that can allow for mutually supportive interpretation with relevant and applicable 
international human rights obligations, in particular with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights.  
Furthermore, CBD parties are discussing the need for new arrangements for indigenous peoples under 
the Convention,128 taking into account the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.  There is, therefore, 
an opportunity to reflect on how the CBD already supports, and discuss how it can better support in 
the future, efforts to implement the SDGs in a manner consistent with States’ obligations under 
international human rights law, as underscored by the Human Rights Council129 and the UN 
Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.130  Recognizing that the SDGs are 
grounded in international human rights that are dependent on biodiversity can serve to prioritize, and 
build new alliances around, the CBD objectives. 
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